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The Companies Act, 1980: Its Effects on
British Corporate Law
The Companies Act, 1980,1 makes basic and important changes in
the corporate law of Great Britain.2 It implements the European Eco-
nomic Community Second Directive on Company Law,3 and also ex-
tends regulations on director conflicts of interest, introduces
prohibitions on insider dealing, requires directors to take employee in-
terest into account, and facilitates minority shareholder access to the
courts.
The Act is divided into six parts. Part I redefines public and pri-
vate companies and governs their formation or re-registration. Part II
regulates the issuance of shares, payment for shares, class rights, and
the maintenance of capital. Part Hm limits distributions by the com-
pany to shareholders. These three parts are primarily concerned with
implementing the Second Directive standards for public companies.
Those standards are aimed at harmonizing corporate law within the
European Community. They reflect an emphasis on the maintenance
of a company's capital for the protection of creditors and the stability
of the company. The standards are not particularly stringent, and
largely correspond to the pre-existing common law rules on the sub-
ject.4 However, following the continental pattern, these standards em-
body a more detailed and prescriptive approach than the British
tradition of allowing considerable judicial discretion in company law
matters.' Parts IV, V, and VI of the Act were added to the original Bill
to accomplish needed reforms, many of which were recommended by
I Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, [hereinafter cited as 1980 Act].
2 The statutory corporate law in Great Britain is contained in the Companies Acts, which are:
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38; parts I and III of the Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81;
Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act, 1972, ch. 67; section 9 of the Euro-
pean Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68; sections I to 4 of the Stock Exchange (Completion of Bar-
gains) Act, 1976, ch. 47; section 9 of the Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, Companies Act, 1976, ch. 69;
Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22. The Companies Act, 1948, is a consolidation of earlier companies
statutes.
3 20 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 26) 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Second Directive].
4 L. Gown, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN CoMeANY LAW 8 (4th ed. 1979).
5 400 PARt. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1245 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard, Minister of State Depart-
ment of Industry).
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the Jenkin's Committee6 and were proposed by earlier Companies Bills
in 1973 and 1978.7 Part IV states a general duty of directors to employ-
ees and imposes further director controls in regard to employment con-
tracts, substantial property transactions, and loans. Part V makes
insider dealing a criminal offense. Part VI consists of miscellaneous
provisions, including the power of a company to provide for its em-
ployees when shutting down, the qualifications of company secretaries,
the increase in penalties under the Companies Acts, and the right of
access to the courts by shareholders who are unfairly prejudiced.
This comment takes each part of the Act in succession and ex-
plains the changes and effects of its various provisions. In addition, it
highlights the Act's international effects and compares it to some of the
basic principles of corporate law in the United States. This approach is
intended to make a complicated act8 more comprehensible to the inter-
national lawyer.
PART I: CLASSIFICATION AND REGISTRATION OF COMPANIES
Part I of the 1980 Act introduces new classifications for companies,
new machinery for registration, and provisions for the transition to the
new system. Section 1 effects a major change in the definition of public
and private companies. The Companies Act, 1948,9 defined private
companies as those that restricted the number of their shareholders to
fifty, limited the transferability of their shares and debentures, and pro-
hibited the offering of their shares and debentures to the public.10 Pub-
lic companies under the 1948 Act were all companies not qualifying as
private companies. Section 1 of the 1980 Act redefines a public
company as a company limited by shares," or a company limited by
guarantee having a share capital, 2 whose memorandum of associa-
6 JENKINS COMMrTEE ON COMPANY LAW, CMD. 3, No. 1749 (1962) [hereinafter cited as THE
JENKINS REPORT].
7 For a basic description of the earlier bills, see 958 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 929-48 (1978)
(J. Smith, Secretary of State for Trade), and 867 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 923-43 (1974) (P.
Walker, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and President of Board of Trade).
8 In debates in the House of Lords, Lord Lloyd of Kigerran referred to the Bill as "job-
creation for hundreds of lawyers," 407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 981 (1980), and some of its
provisions have been referred to as "half-baked." Id. at 1046 (Lord Mishcon).
9 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, [hereinafter cited as 1948 Act].
10 Id. § 28.
11 A company limited by shares is "a company having the liability of its members limited by
the memorandum to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by them." Id.
§ l(2)(a).
12 A company limited by guarantee is "a company having the liability of its members limited
by the memorandum to such amount as the members may respectively thereby undertake to con-
tribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up." Id. § l(2)(b). A company
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tion 13 states that it is to be a public company, and which complies with
the registration requirements of a public company. The major require-
ments are that the company has "public limited company," or "plc," at
the end of its name, 14 and that it has the minimum authorized share
capital required of a public company. 5 Under the 1980 Act, all com-
panies not meeting these requirements are considered private compa-
nies. This change in definitions broadens the category of private
companies by allowing companies with more than fifty shareholders
and without restrictions on share transferability to be classified as pri-
vate companies. On the other hand, it narrows the category of public
companies by requiring a minimum share capital in order to be classi-
fied as public companies.
Originally, the separate classification of private companies was
created to exempt certain smaller companies from several normal com-
pany law requirements.' 6  The Companies Act, 1967,17 removed the
most important of these exemptions: the freedom from filing annual
reports and the freedom from the restrictions against loans to direc-
tors.'8 The remaining distinctions were generally minimal, but allowed
private companies to be formed and run with slightly less formality and
expense.
19
limited by guarantee having a share capital is one which issues shares with liability limited to the
amount unpaid, as well as guarantee shares.
13 The memorandum of association is the equivalent to a corporation's articles of incorpora-
tion in the United States.
14 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 2(2). There is some dissatisfaction over the new name "plc.' One Mem-
ber of Parliament said that it "sounds rather like a plastic material of some sort," 972 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 79 (1979) (G. Page). But, as another said, there appears to be no better solution.
Id. at 55 (C. Parkinson). The Welsh equivalent, "cwnmi cyfynged'g cyhoeddus," or "ccc," seems to
have met with more approval. 401 PARL. Dan., H.L. (5th ser.) 157 (1979) (Lord Elwyn-Jones).
15 1980 Act, ch. 22, §§ 3(2), 4(2). The minimum is currently set at £50,000 by § 85(1).
16 The distinction is clearly made in the Company (Consolidation) Act of 1908, which follows
the tentative approach of the 1900 Act. See L. GowER, supra note 4, at 13.
17 Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, [hereinafter cited as 1967 Act].
18 The exemptions for private companies under sections 129 and 190 of the 1948 Act were
repealed by the 1967 Act. 1967 Act, ch. 81, § 130(4)(C).
19 Private companies may commence immediately upon incorporation, while public compa-
nies must obtain a certificate under section 4, (or formerly under section 109 of the 1948 Act).
Private companies may have one director, whereas public companies are required to have at least
two. 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 176. Private companies are not restricted in allotting
shares, as are public companies, by the minimum subscription requirement and the prospectus or
statement in lieu of prospectus requirements. Id. §§ 47, 48, 50, 51. Motions for appointments of
directors must be separate for public but not private companies. Id. § 183. Age restrictions for
directors are applicable only to public companies and their subsidiaries. Id. § 185. Private com-
panies are given three months longer to file their annual reports, and the requirement for keeping
past accounting records is three years shorter than for public companies. Companies Act, 1976,
ch. 69, §§ 6(2), 12(9) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act]. Prior to the 1980 Act, there were several other
advantages. Private companies did not have to meet the statutory meeting and reporting require-
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With the advent of the 1980 Act, the distinction again becomes
important. The European Economic Community Second Directive ap-
plies only to public companies,20 although the 1980 Act extends a
number of its requirements to private companies as well.21 Many com-
panies classed as public companies under the old definition could not
have met all the new requirements, and so the definition was altered to
narrow the public company classification.22 The remaining provisions
of part I are not so much concerned with implementing the Directive as
with simplifying and adjusting the procedures used to form a public
company, making a few minor reforms, and governing the transition to
the new classifications.
Section 1 also prospectively prohibits the formation of any compa-
nies limited by guarantee having a share capital.23 This step will help
clarify the distinction between commercial and other types of organiza-
tions, since companies limited by guarantee are usually charitable and
quasi-charitable associations.24 Although section 1 does not affect ex-
isting companies limited by guarantee having a share capital, it will
prevent any more from being formed.
The formation process for public companies is provided for in sec-
tions 2, 3, and 4. The procedure is easier than that formerly required
under the 1948 Act. These sections reduce the number of shareholders
required from seven to two,2 eliminate several formalities previously
required,26 and simplify the requirements for a public company to ob-
tain a certificate entitling it to do business or exercise borrowing pow-
ers.27 The only change in the formation of private companies is the
definitional change which no longer requires them to maintain the
ments in section 130 of the 1948 Act, (repealed by 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 82) and could be formed by
only two persons, instead of the seven required to form a public company by section one of the
1948 Act (modified by 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 2).
20 See Second Directive, supra note 3, art. 1, at 2.
21 400 PARL. DEa., H.L. (5th ser.) 1241, 1243 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard).
22 Id. at 1240. The new definition now excludes companies of minor substance but with a
large number of members, such as tenant associations, which would have been classified as public
companies under the old definition. 401 PAaR. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 24 (1979) (Lord Lyell).
23 See supra note 12.
24 See Hare, Companies Act 1980-I, 124 SOLIcrroRS' J. 503 (1980). The Jenkins Committee
on Company Law thought it inappropriate that a company formed with the intentions of making
pro rata distributions to its shareholders could register as a company limited by guarantee. THE
JENKINS REPORT, supra note 6, at 23, 70.
25 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 2(1).
26 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 130 (repealed by 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 82), required a
statutory meeting and statutory report of companies within three months of commencing business.
27 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 4, replacing 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 109.
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three restrictions in their articles.28
Sections 5, 7, and 13 provide for re-registration of a private com-
pany, an unlimited company,2 9 or a joint stock company3" as a public
company. These provisions mainly ensure that the company makes the
necessary changes in its structure and meets the share capital require-
ments. The company must pass a special resolution31 to change its
memorandum to state that it is a public company, and make any other
necessary changes in its memorandum or articles. 32 It must also pro-
duce the company's balance sheet and auditor's report to show the nec-
essary share capital.
Section 9 requires the re-registration of companies classified as
public companies under the old definition (old public companies) by
March, 1982.33 Section 8 provides that old public companies may re-
register as public companies if the directors take the necessary steps
and if the company is able to meet the relevant standards, or as a pri-
vate company if the shareholders pass a special resolution to that effect.
Similarly, under section 10, a special resolution of the shareholders is
required for a public company re-registering as a private company. In
both cases, a court may at its discretion set aside these special resolu-
tions on the application of a minority shareholder under section 11.
This provision is intended to provide a safeguard for minority share-
holder interests, since becoming a private company extensively affects
the marketability of shares and the rights of shareholders.3 4 Section 12
also gives the court authority to take into account such considerations
when confirming a reduction in the share capital 5 of a public company
28 See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. Articles are the equivalent of corporate by-
laws in the United States. Private companies may continue to maintain the three restrictions in
their articles if they so choose. 401 PARL. DEn., H.L. (5th ser.) 25 (1979) (Lord Lyell). For the
three restrictions, see supra text accompanying note 10.
29 Unlimited companies are companies formed without limited liability. 1948 Act, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, ch. 38, § l(2)(c).
30 A joint stock company is "a company having a permanent paid-up or nominal share capital
of fixed amount divided into shares, also of fixed amount,... and formed on the principle of
having for its members the holders of those shares ... and no other persons." 1948 Act, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, ch. 38, §383.
31 A special resolution requires a three-fourths majority. Id. § 141.
32 The articles are the equivalent of a United States corporation's bylaws.
33 1980 Act, ch. 22, 9(1); STAT. INST. 1785. The Companies Act, 1980 (Commencement No. 2)
Order 1980 fixed 22 December 1980 as the appointed day for the purpose of section 9(1), as al-
lowed by section 90(3).
34 See infra text accompanying note 50. See also Hare, CompaniesAct-1, 124 SOCrrOS'
J. 520 (1980).
35 Court confirmation of reduction of a company's share capital is required by the 1948 Act, to
protect creditors. 1948 Act, I1 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 66(1).
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which brings the share capital below the minimum capital require-
ments, forcing it to become a private company.
Before the 1980 Act, public companies usually acted through sub-
sidiary36 private companies because of the ease of formation and the
slightly less stringent regulation.37 This practice is likely to continue
under the 1980 Act. British or foreign subsidiaries which are registered
in Britain, regardless of where they are located, are classified as public
or private companies on their own accord.38 Wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies would have no incentive to register as public companies, since they
are not concerned with the marketability of their shares, and they cer-
tainly are not eager to take on any additional restrictions. Partially-
owned subsidiaries must weigh the benefits of a market for their shares
against the costs of additional regulation. The new Act, however,
should not discourage the British registration of subsidiaries of interna-
tional companies, since it continues to allow registration as a private
company and does not regulate private companies as much as public
companies.
The distinction redrawn and further developed by the Act between
public and private companies in Britain corresponds to distinctions in
the United States. In the United States, the federal securities laws and
regulations apply only to companies whose shares are publicly
traded.39 Likewise, Delaware, following a trend started by North Car-
olina in 1955, has established special provisions relating to close corpo-
rations.' These provisions allow greater flexibility in management and
variance from some corporate law norms.41 Delaware's definition of a
close corporation is substantially the same as the old definition of a
private company under the 1948 Act in Britain.42
36 A company is a subsidiary of another company if some of its shares are owned by, and the
composition of its board is controlled by, that other company, if more than one-half of its equity
share capital is owned by that other company, or if it is a subsidiary of a subsidiary of that other
company. Id. § 154.
37 See L. GOWER, supra note 4, at 118. See also supra note 19.
38 401 PARL. Dn., H.L. (5th ser.) 22 (1979) (Lord Lyell).
39 The Securities Act of 1933 exempts transactions not involving any public offering from
coverage. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). Certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
apply only to securities listed on a national exchange. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1976). Others also
apply to companies with assets over $1,000,000 and more than 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1976).
40 W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, CORPORATIONS 14 (5th ed. 1980).
41 Delaware allows the shareholders of a close corporation to agree to restrict the discretion of
the directors and to manage the company directly, and also makes special provisions for the reso-
lution of disputes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350-355 (1979).
42 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1979), with 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 28.
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PART II: THE CAPITAL OF A COMPANY
Part II implements the Second Directive requirements applicable
to the capital of a public company, though some of these requirements
have been extended to private companies as well. Sections 14 to 19
govern the issue of share capital. Shareholders receive increased con-
trol over the issue of capital in the form of the restrictions on director
authority to allot shares in section 14 and the pre-emption rights in
sections 17, 18, and 19. These provisions were considered valuable pro-
tections warranting their extension to private, as well as public,
companies. 43
Section 14 provides that directors of a company must have proper
authorization before they can allot shares.44 Authorization may be
qualified or unqualified, and may be given for a period up to five years
by the company's articles (bylaws) or by a resolution of a general meet-
ing of the shareholders. The authorization may be revoked or modified
by a vote of the shareholders. Section 14, therefore, gives ultimate con-
trol over the growth of the share capital of the company to the
shareholders.
Section 17 requires a company to offer any new shares to its ex-
isting shareholders in proportion to their current holdings before it of-
fers them for cash to anyone else. This pre-emption right permits a
shareholder to maintain his proportional holding in a company when it
issues new shares, and is similar to a Stock Exchange Listing Agree-
ment provision.4 The pre-emption right also ensures that the value of
the shareholder's interest in the company will not be diluted by the
company selling shares below their true value. In this case, the share-
holder may sell his right to purchase shares,46 and thereby receive the
difference between the price and their true value without actually
purchasing the shares. The pre-emption right does not extend to allot-
ments made wholly or partially for non-cash consideration.47 This ex-
emption allows the company the freedom to exchange shares for
property or for shares in another company, enabling it to acquire
The only substantive difference is that Delaware limits the number of shareholders to 30, while the
1948 Act limited the number to 50.
43 972 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 56 (1979) (C. Parkinson, Minister of State, Department of
Trade).
44 Under section 87(2), shares are "alloted" when a person acquires the unconditional right to
be included in the company's register of members with respect to those shares.
45 400 PARL. DaB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1242 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard).
46 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 17(3)(b).
47 Id. § 17(4).
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needed assets or conduct a merger or consolidation with another com-
pany without being frustrated by pre-emption rights.
Where authorization to allot shares under section 14 has been
given, section 18 provides that the articles or a special resolution of the
shareholders may waive or modify pre-emption rights. Private compa-
nies may retain pre-existing arrangements contained in their memoran-
dum or articles which are inconsistent with the 1980 Act pre-emption
rights.
48
Shareholder control over capital in a private company protects in-
vestors, who have a personal stake in the company, from losing their
voice or proper share in the company. It is questionable whether this
same protection is equally needed by shareholders in large public com-
panies. In practice, public company shareholders are likely to give up
such rights regularly to provide the directors with flexibility in using
their business judgment to raise capital. The 1980 Act gives public
company shareholders control over capital that they do not really need,
and which they are likely to waive every five years, or whenever the
directors ask for their waiver.49
Private companies may not issue their shares or debentures to the
public.50 This prohibition replaces the former requirement of a state-
ment in the company's articles to that effect."1 However, issuing shares
or debentures of a private company to the public is now a criminal
offense, which can subject the company and any officer involved to a
fine.
52
Any new offering of shares by a public company must be fully
subscribed before any of the shares are allotted,53 unless the offer states
that shares may be allotted in any event or upon specific conditions.54
This provision should keep issues of new shares at the level reasonably
expected to be subscribed, and, in effect, requires the issue to be with-
drawn where the expectations of both the company and the investors
were not fulfilled.
48 Id. § 17(9).
49 The Stock Exchange required pre-emption rights for listed companies prior to the 1980 Act.
400 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1241 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard). This author is not familiar with
the effect of that requirement and bases his conclusion on United States practices.
50 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 15(1).
51 See supra text accompanying note 10.
52 The fine for violating section 15 may be up to the statutory maximum of E1,000. See infra
note 226.
53 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 16(1)(a).
54 Id. § 16(1)(b). Even if the offer states that the offering does not have to be fully subscribed,
the minimum amount to be raised, as stated in the prospectus, must be subscribed before any
shares are allotted. 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §47.
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Sections 20 to 31 regulate the payment for shares. Section 20, re-
quiring shares to be paid up in money or money's worth, and section
21, prohibiting discounts, are largely restatements of the law and apply
to both public and private companies. Sections 22 to 31 add new re-
quirements to British law, and apply only to public companies.55
The section 20 requirement that shares, and any premium on
them, be paid up in money or in money's worth changes the law in that
it explicitly excludes undertakings to do work or perform services as
payment for shares.56 It also provides the company with a right of ac-
tion against a person receiving the shares on such an undertaking for
the value of the shares. However, this section expressly allows goodwill
and know-how as payment for shares, and does not exclude work or
services already provided.
The House of Lords, in Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India v.
Roper,5 7 established the rule against issuing shares at a discount. Lord
Macnaughten stated: "[tihe dominant and cardinal principle of... [the
Companies] Act... is that the investor shall purchase immunity from
liability beyond a certain limit, on the terms that there shall be and
remain a liability up to that limit."5 8 This is to say, the shareholder is
liable up to the value of his shares, and may not by agreement alter the
amount of his liability. Discounted shares were treated as not fully
paid up, with the shareholder remaining liable to contribute the bal-
ance when called upon to do so.59 This rule was weakened in practice,
however, by issuing shares in return for over-valued non-cash consider-
ation,' the payment of underwriting commissions,6" and the allowance
of discount with permission from the court.62 The rule in Mosely v.
Koff)fontein Mines, Ltd.,63 however, precluded discounting through the
use of convertible debentures.
55 972 PARL. Dn., H.C. (5th ser.) 56 (1979) (C. Parkinson).
56 Undertakings to do work or perform services have been accepted as payment for shares in
the past. Under the 1980 Act, companies must have discharged such undertakings. 1980 Act, ch.
22, §§ 6(I)(c), 8(11)(b).
57 1892 A.C. 125.
58 Id. at 145. See also supra note 11.
59 Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India v. Roper, 1892 A.C. 125, 137 (Lord Watson). See also
infra note 66.
60 See L. Govwn, supra note 4, at 219. The company's valuation of consideration was ac-
cepted as conclusive, In re Wragg, Ltd. [1897] 1 Ch. 796, unless it was inadequate on its face, In re
White Star Line, Ltd. [1939] Ch. 458, or if there was evidence of fraud or the lack of any bona fide
valuation, Tintin Exploration Syndicate v. Sandys [1947] 177 L.T.R. 412.
61 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38,§53.
62 Id. § 57.
63 [190412 Ch. 108. The company proposed issuing debentures at a discount which could later
be exchanged for fully paid up shares of an amount equal to the face value of the debentures. The
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Section 21 restates the rule against discounts and eliminates the
exception to the rule with court approval.64 Further, independent valu-
ation requirements should prevent public companies from issuing
shares for over-valued non-cash consideration.65 The Act does not dis-
turb the payment of underwriting commissions.
Shares of a public company are to be paid up to at least one quar-
ter of their nominal value and all of any premium before they are allot-
ted.66 Though it is the general practice to fully pay up shares within a
short time of issue,67 this provision establishes a minimum to avoid
abuse. Section 23 requires that payment for shares in the form of an
undertaking must be performed within five years.68 This provision is
concerned with the company getting something for its shares within a
reasonable time.
Section 24 provides that a qualified independent expert must valu-
ate non-cash consideration and report to the company before any pub-
lic company shares can be allotted for that consideration.69 A violation
of the requirement causes the holder of the shares to be liable to the
company for their nominal value. The requirement is waived in situa-
tions where the company is making a tender offer for shares in another
company or is involved in a merger, thus avoiding difficult valuation
problems and leaving the decision to the directors' judgment. The per-
son making the valuation is empowered to require relevant company
information.7" Any person knowingly or recklessly making false or
misleading statements is subject to a fine or two years imprisonment or
both.7 1
Independent expert valuation of all non-cash assets transferred be-
tween a public company and a subscriber to the memorandum is re-
quired within two years of the formation of the company, or between
the company and the shareholder within two years of that company's
re-registration as a public company, if those assets equal or exceed ten
Court of Appeal held this would result in shares being issued at a discount and injoined the
issuance of the debentures.
64 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 21.
65 Id. §§ 24, 25.
66 Id. § 22. Payment of the full nominal value of a newly issued share may not be immedi-
ately required. Shares are said to be paid up to the extent that their nominal value has been paid
by the holder.
67 See J. CHARLESWORTH & T. CAIN, COMPANY LAW 211 (11th ed. 1977).
68 Undertakings to do work or perform services are prohibited. 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 20.
69 Id. § 24(l),(4).
70 Id. § 25(1).
71 Id. § 25(5).
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percent of the nominal value of the company's issued capital.7 2 The
company's shareholders must also approve such a transfer by resolu-
tion. These requirements are in addition to the valuation requirements
of section 24 for non-cash consideration for the allotment of shares. A
violation of the provisions of this section voids the transfer, unless it is
for the allotment of shares. An exception to the requirements is al-
lowed where to acquire such assets is in the company's ordinary course
of business.73
Where liability is imposed for failure to make proper payment for
shares, the court, under section 28, may grant relief if it appears just
and equitable to do so, considering any payment or the likelihood of
payment and the degree of culpability involved. The company and any
officers involved may also be fined for not requiring the proper pay-
ment for shares.74
Sections 32 and 33 clarify and extend the law concerning the vari-
ation of class rights. If a company has more than one class of shares,
class rights are usually set out in the company's articles (bylaws), which
also usually provide that alterations can be made with the consent of a
prescribed majority of the class.75 If rights are set out in the memoran-
dum and there is no provision for variation, section 206 of the 1948 Act
allows alterations with the approval of three-fourths of the class and
the court.
Under section 32, if class rights are granted in the memorandum,
they may be varied in a way provided in the original articles, though if
the variation of rights concerns the authority to issue or reduce capital,
three-fourths of the class must approve. If there is no provision for
varying rights granted in the memorandum, those rights may be varied
only by the unanimous agreement of the shareholders, or through the
judicial powers under section 206 of the 1948 Act.76 If the class rights
are granted other than in the memorandum, such as in the articles,
these rights may still be varied according to a provision of the articles.
If there is no provision in the articles, or if the variation concerns the
authority to issue or reduce capital, rights granted other than in the
72 Id. § 26. The subscribers to the memorandum are those people who sign and register the
memorandum of association to form the company, and who agree to take and pay for shares in the
company. See 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 1, 12, 26.
73 For example, a real estate company could purchase real estate from a subscriber to the
memorandum within two years without obtaining independent expert valuation and shareholder
approval74 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 30.
75 See THE JEmKiNs REPORT, supra note 6, at 70, 188. Minorities could appeal such a
change to the court under the 1948 Act, I1 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 72.
76 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 32(5).
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memorandum may be varied only with the approval of three-fourths of
the class. Any class rights which are not stated in the memorandum,
articles, or a registered resolution, and any variation of those rights
must be filed with the registrar of companies."
Sections 34 to 38 are concerned with the maintenance of a com-
pany's capital. A mandatory general meeting must be held if the net
assets of a public company fall to half the company's called up share
capital.7" This provision is meant to call the attention of the sharehold-
ers to a major drop in assets.79 It at least forces the management to
explain itself in the event of a drastic fall in assets and could prompt
the shareholders to change management or make decisions concerning
the future of the company. Additionally, the common law rule that
companies cannot acquire their own shares is codified and is applicable
to both public and private companies."0 This rule was established in
Trevor v. Whitworth8" on the grounds that such an acquisition would
amount to an unauthorized reduction of capital to the detriment of
creditors. The acquisition of shares in a reduction of capital with the
consent of the court, as provided by sections 66 to 71 of the 1948 Act, is
not affected. Companies may also take gifts of fully paid-up shares
directly.82 The rule does not prohibit the calling in of fully paid re-
deemable preference shares using profits or the proceeds, of a new is-
sue,83 the purchase of minority interests by the company under a court
order, 4 or the forfeiture or surrender in lieu of forfeiture for failure to
make the required payments on such shares.85
Section 36 states that shares issued to a nominee of the company or
partially paid up shares acquired from a third party by a nominee of
the company shall be treated as held by the nominee as his own; the
company shall have no beneficial interest in them. Liability for any
77 Id. § 33.
78 Id. § 34. Called up share capital is that part of issued capital which has been paid up by the
shareholders. It is usually equal to the issued capital. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying
text.
79 401 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 32 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard).
80 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 35(1).
81 1887 A.C. 409. Several of their Lordships also concluded that the purchase of the com-
pany's own shares was outside the objects of the company set forth in the memorandum, and was,
therefore, ultra vires. Id.
82 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 35(2). Formerly, under the common law, a nominee of the company
could receive a gift of the company's shares to hold in trust for the company. Kirby v. Wilkins,
[1929] 2 Ch. 444.
83 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 58, allows this practice.
84 The court may require the purchase of minority interests under certain circumstances. Id.
§ 5; 1980 Act, ch. 22, §§ 11, 75.
85 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 35(4).
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amount payable on those shares, however, is imposed on any director
or subscriber to the company's memorandum involved in such an issu-
ance, as well as on the nominee.
Section 37 regulates the short-term holding by a public company
of its own shares to ensure that such holdings do not distort the control
or the account of the company. A public company must cancel any
shares forfeited or surrendered in lieu of forfeiture, or any shares in
which the company has a beneficial interest, within three years. The
company must also make the necessary adjustments in the amount of
its share capital, and, if necessary, of its classification as a public com-
pany.86 Shares held by the company or by a nominee of the company
may not exercise any voting rights, and if the nominee received com-
pany assistance in acquiring the shares, the period for cancellation is
reduced to one year. Where a public company's books show its own
shares or an interest in those shares as an asset, an equivalent amount
of profits available for distribution must be placed in a reserve fund.
Finally, section 38 prohibits public companies from establishing liens
or charges over their own shares, except to secure payment of any
amount unpaid on those shares or where such liens are made in the
ordinary course of business.87
Most of the general principles of part II correspond to principles in
corporate law of the United States. Generally, stockholders in the
United States have less control over the capital of publicly held corpo-
rations. The authority to issue shares is often given to the board with
such limits as may be found in the certificate of incorporation.
88 Of
course, power to increase any limits set in this way remains with the
shareholders. Pre-emption rights are generally recognized in the
United States, but most states allow limitations on those rights,89 or
exclude such rights unless the certificate of incorporation explicitly pro-
vides for them.90 United States law is similar to British law in requir-
ing lawful consideration for stock.91 Future services are generally
86 If the company fails to re-register as a private company when necessary under this section,
it will continue to be treated as a public company except that it is prohibited from selling shares to
the public. Id. § 37(6).
87 Two other exceptions are applicable to liens which pre-date re-registration as a public com-
pany under the 1980 Act. Id. §§ 38(2)(c), (d).
88 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 120(a)(4) (1979).
89 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 622 (McKinney 1963) (pre-emption may be limited by the
certificate of incorporation).
90 See Dnr.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (1979) (pre-emption rights do not exist unless ex-
pressly granted in the certificate of incorporation).
91 See DEL. COD ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1979).
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disallowed, though a few states have broken from the rule.92 Some
states do not allow the exchange of shares for particular knowledge and
experience, 93 a practice expressly allowed under the 1980 Act in Brit-
ain. The rule against issuing shares at a discount is also common in the
United States, 94 but this rule is weakened by the absence of independ-
ent valuation requirements. 95 Class rights in the United States are usu-
ally found in the certificate of incorporation. 96 They may be altered in
the normal manner of amending the certificate, which in Delaware, for
example, involves obtaining the approval of a majority of each class of
stock entitled to vote on the issue, unless the certificate itself contains a
provision requiring some greater proportion. 97 A company's acquisi-
tion of its own shares is much less restricted in the United States than
in Britain. It is usually freely allowed unless it would impair the capi-
tal of the corporation. 98 However, as under British law, shares held by
a United States company cannot be voted by the company.99
Overall, British standards are slightly more restrictive than those
in the United States. However, the British standards are not too bur-
densome, since shareholder authorization to allot shares and remove
pre-emption rights should be easy to obtain in public companies, and
the valuation requirements for non-cash consideration and substantial
transfers of assets are not applicable to the great majority of transac-
tions. The British limitations on a company acquiring its own shares
may cause some inconvenience, but it does not limit any important cor-
porate function. Offsetting any additional burden, the British stan-
dards may be more effective than their United States counterparts in
protecting the integrity of a company's capital. It is questionable
whether creditors actually rely on a company's stated capital when ex-
tending credit or making a loan, and, therefore, these requirements
may have little effect on them except if the company is wound up. Still,
these requirements directly affect the shareholders, and ensure that
each makes a properly proportional contribution to the company.
92 See, ag., MICH. Comp. LAWS § 450.1315(l) (1982); VA. CODE § 13.1-17 (1978).
93 See Brown v. Watson, 285 A.D. 587, 588, 139 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (1955).
94 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 153(a) (1979).
95 See id. § 152 (directors' valuation of consideration conclusive in the absence of actual
fraud).
96 See id. §§ 102(a)(4), 151.
97 See id. § 242(c)(1).
98 See id. § 160(a).
99 See id. § 160(c).
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PART III: RESTRICTIONS ON DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS AND ASSETS
Part III of the Act represents the first attempt to codify and reform
British law governing the distribution of profits to shareholders. 1"0 The
general common law rule, established in such cases as Flitcroft's
Case,1' 1 was that dividends could only be paid out of profits. Such
distributions could not be made if it would result in the company's in-
ability to pay its debts. ' 2 Losses of circulating assets during the current
year had to be made good before dividends could be distributed,10 3 but
losses and depreciation on fixed assets,' 4 and, in England though not
in Scotland, losses from previous years 10 5 did not have to be consid-
ered. Profits from previous years, 06 realized capital gains, 107 and, in
England though not in Scotland, unrealized capital gains"1 could also
be distributed as dividends. Because these rules ignored losses from
previous years and losses on fixed assets, their overall restrictive effect
was minimal, and they did little to constrain a company from depleting
100 The Minister of State, Department of Trade, Cecil Parkinson, summed it up, "[the] law in
this area is, to say the least, confused." 972 PARPL DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 58 (1979).
101 In re Exchange Banking Co., [1882] 21 Ch. D. 519. The directors knowingly included bad
debts as assets on the company's balance sheets, creating a false profit which was distributed as
dividends. The Court of Appeals stated the distribution was an improper use of capital and held
the directors liable.
102 Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., [1889] 41 Ch. D. 1 (distribution of dividends had no effect
on the company's ability to pay its debts, and was not invalid on that ground).
103 In re National Bank of Wales, [1899] 2 Ch. 629 (losses of circulating assets, used in procur-
ing returns, must be deducted from those returns in order to determine distributable profits, but
the bank showed annual profits, and did not have to consider losses due to bad debts from previ-
ous years).
104 Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., [1889] 41 Ch. D. 1. Even though the company's primary
asset, a mining concession, was being consumed by annual operation, the dimunition of value did
not have to be considered to determine profits, and dividends could be paid as long as revenues
exceeded current operating expenses and the company retained sufficient assets to pay its
creditors.
105 Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266. The English court ruled that the
company's losses from previous years, though they might reduce capital, id., did not have to be
made up before current profits could be distributed. In Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co. v. Hurll,
[1891] 18 R. 805, the Scottish court suggested that the current earnings must first be applied to the
losses from the previous year before dividends could be paid.
106 In re Hoare & Co., Ltd. and Reduced, [1904] 2 Ch. 208. The Court approved of the com-
pany's retention of part of its reserve fund of previous years' profits and premiums and the pay-
ment of profits from that fund, even though a severe loss of assets necessitated a reduction of the
company's capital.
107 Lubbock v. British Bank of S. Am., [1892] 2 Ch. 198. The sale and repurchase of the bank's
business in Brazil resulted in a capital gain of £205,000, which is distributable profit.
108 Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co. v. Laurie, [1961] Ch. 353, 370-374. The English court
held that any unrealized profit resulting from a revaluation of fixed assets may be distributed as a
dividend or capitalized. In Westbum Sugar Refineries v. Inland Revenue, 1960 S.L.T. 297, the
Scottish court held that the amount of unrealized profit resulting from a revaluation of fixed assets
which was capitalized by the company was not subject to tax since it was not a distributable sum.
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its capital. A company's memorandum could, however, impose further
restrictions if desired. 1
0 9
The 1980 Act replaces most of these rules.110 All companies, both
public and private, may now only distribute profits available for distri-
bution. Profits available for distribution are defined as accumulated
realized profits less accumulated realized losses."' This definition
means that all past losses, both losses on fixed assets and operating
losses, 112 must be made up before any dividends may be paid. The
common law requirement that the distribution not render the company
unable to pay its debts, and the allowance of further restrictions by the
company itself, should remain in effect along with the statutory
provisions. 1
3
Public companies must meet a further requirement before paying
dividends. Section 40 requires that the net assets of a public company
both before and after any distribution must be at least equal to the
capital of the company and undistributable reserves. It includes among
undistributable reserves an account equivalent to the amount by which
the accumulated unrealized profits exceed its accumulated unrealized
losses. This requirement means public companies must cover any un-
realized losses which exceed unrealized gains before paying a
dividend. 1
4
Section 41 contains special distribution rules for investment com-
panies. An investment company is one whose business consists of in-
vesting its funds "mainly""' in securities and is prohibited by its
memorandum or articles from distributing capital profits. It may dis-
tribute any excess of accumulated realized revenue profits less accumu-
lated realized or unrealized revenue losses if its assets are fifty percent
greater than its liabilities before and after any distribution. Section 42
applies to insurance company distributions, and defines profit or loss as
any surplus or deficit in an insurance fund, which is the difference be-
109 In re Oxford Benefit Building & Investment Society, [1886] 35 Ch. D. 502. The company's
memorandum required that dividends be paid only out of realized profits. The directors were
held liable for dividends distributed on the basis of estimated profits without any reference to
realized profits.
110 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 39.
111 Id. § 39(2).
112 Id. § 45(4).
113 See L. GowER, supra note 4, at 233. See also 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 45(5).
114 400 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1244 (1979) (Viscount Trenchard).
115 "Mainly" was used in order to give such companies greater flexibility in their investments:
it will probably be interpreted as "more than half." See Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham
County Council, 1961 A.C. 636, 669 (Lord Morton of Hem-yton).
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tween the assets of that fund and its liabilities as determined by actua-
rial investigation.
Section 43 provides that the application of part III of the Act is to
be determined by reference to the company's properly prepared annual
or interim accounts. Section 44 provides that any shareholder who
knows or has reasonable grounds for believing that a distribution is
made in violation of this part of the Act is liable to repay it to the
company. The common law also made directors liable to refund divi-
dends paid on fictitious profits,"16 and the courts may extend this liabil-
ity to violations of the 1980 Act, as well. Section 45 exempts bonus
shares, redemptions of preference shares, reductions of share capital,
and any distributions upon winding up a company from the coverage
of these requirements. These activities either do not have an adverse
effect on creditors, as in the case of bonus shares, or are sufficiently
regulated by other provisions of the Companies Acts." 7
In the United States, there are four basic approaches, often found
in combination, to limiting the distribution of dividends."' Some
states prohibit distribution which would cause or worsen company in-
solvency." 9 Some states require that distributions be made only out of
surplus, the excess of net assets over capital. 120 Some states have limi-
tations based on'current earnings.12 ' Some states have limitations al-
lowing distribution only out of earned surplus, the corporation's
accumulated profits.'I The earned surplus test differs from the surplus
test in that the earned surplus test disallows distributions from paid-in
surplus (the premiums paid on issued stock), from reduction surplus
(the amount by which stated capital can be reduced in some circum-
stances), and from revaluation surplus (the unrealized appreciation on
fixed assets). The earned surplus test is the closest to the approach of
the 1980 Act in regard to public companies, and the insolvency test is
equivalent to that in British common law.1 23
116 See supra note 101.
117 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 58 (governs redeemable preference shares); id. §§ 66-71
(govern reductions of share capital); id. §§ 271-365 (govern winding up).
118 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 40, at 1336.
119 See MAss. ANN. Ch. 156B, § 61 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1982) (insolvency used as the sole
test); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAWS § 510(a) (McKinney 1963).
120 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAWS § 510(b) (McKinney 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1979).
121 See KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.225 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1979).
122 See PA. CONS. STAT. § 1702(A)(1) (1967).
123 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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PART IV: DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Section 46 of part IV requires directors to take into account the
general interests of employees of the company, as well as its sharehold-
ers. This is an addition to the general duty to act "bona fide in what
they consider ... is in the interests of the company as a whole."
1 24
Previously, the duty to act in the company's interest left no room for
consideration of employee interests unless they coincided with the in-
terests of the shareholders.' 25 While these interests often coincide be-
cause it is in the shareholders' interests to ensure employee cooperation
and thereby increase productivity, previously the directors bore the
burden of proving that actions in the interest of employees were actu-
ally made for the benefit of the company.' 26 In contrast, section 46
imposes a positive duty on directors, which will raise the standard of
care in considering employee interests 27 and provide a shield against
challenges to actions which benefit employees. 28 How the interests of
the shareholders and the employees are to be balanced is apparently
left up to the directors' discretion.
The duty to have regard for employee interests is owed to the com-
pany and is enforceable in the same manner as other fiduciary duties
owed to the company. 129 This normally means that only the company
can bring suit to enforce it.'30 It is unclear if and under what circum-
stances a shareholder derivative action might be brought, but it seems
evident that employees may enforce the duty only if they also hold
shares in the company.' 3 '
The remainder of part IV is concerned with transactions which are
particularly susceptible to conflicts of interest between the director and
the company as a whole. Sections 47 to 53 restrict certain types of
transactions and sections 54 to 61 relate to disclosure requirements.
Shareholder approval is required for all contracts of employment,
124 In re Smith & Fawcett, Ltd., [1942] 1 Ch. 304, 306 (Lord Green, M.R.).
125 See Hutton v. W. Cork Ry. Co., [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654; Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [19621 1
Ch. 927. In both cases, the directors were restrained from paying compensation to employees for
the loss of their jobs when the company was being wound up because the compensation would
further no business purpose of the company.
126 Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] 1 Ch. 927, 954.
127 See 407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1019 (1980) (Lord Mackay of Clashfern, citing a Law
Society memorandum).
128 401 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 88 (1979) (Lord Elwyn-Jones).
129 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 46(2).
130 Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 67 Eng. Rep. 189. See also infra text accompanying notes 231-44.
131 "The employee does not enter the company stage as a litigant unless he becomes something
else. If he buys a share, then he may bring a shareholder's action where that is permitted ....
407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1028 (1980) (Lord Wedderburn of Charlton).
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including contracts for services, 13 2 between the director and the com-
pany which exceed five years in length and which do not allow termi-
nation by notice of the company for any reason. 133 This approval
requirement also applies to employment contracts between the director
and the company entered into more than six months in advance of the
expiration of a current contract which would have the effect of guaran-
teeing employment for more than five years. 134 The contravention of
these requirements voids the term concerning the duration of the con-
tract, and allows the company to terminate it by notice at any time.
Shareholder approval is also required for any substantial purchases or
sales of non-cash assets between a company and the director of that
company or a director of its holding company or any person connected
with such a director. 135 Approval is necessary if the transaction in-
volves an asset or assets valued over £50,000 or valued over £1,000 and
exceeding ten percent of the amount of the company's net assets.
136 If
the transaction is not approved, it is voidable by the company except
when: (1) restitution is no longer possible; (2) the company has been
indemnified for any loss; (3) the avoidance would affect third parties
who were unaware of the violation; or (4) the transaction is approved
by the shareholders within a reasonable time.137 The director or the
connected person involved and any director who knowingly authorized
the violation are accountable to the company for any gains to them,
and liable to the company for any loss or damage to it.
The intention behind the provisions related to employment con-
tracts and substantial property transactions is to eliminate the weak-
nesses of prior regulations exposed in a number of inspector's
reports. 138 The provisions are similar in nature to provisions in the
Stock Exchange Listing agreement, though those provisions only cover
employment for over ten years. 139 Contracts with directors have long
been voidable at the insistence of the company," 40 but the company's
132 British law makes a distinction between contracts of service, where a person is hired full
time as part of the company, and contract/or services, where a person hires himself out as an
independent agent, such as a consultant. The distinction often is hard to determine at the margin.
See id. at 1093-95 (Lord Wedderbum of Charleton).
133 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 47(2).
134 Id. § 47(3).
135 Id. § 48(1).
136 Id. § 48(2).
137 Id. § 48(3).
138 407 PARn. DEn., H.L. (5th ser.) 1044 (1980) (Lord Lyell).
139 401 PAR.. DEn., H. L. (5th ser.) 103 (1979) (Lord Mishcon).
140 Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros., [1854] D. 470; Boulting v. Association of Cinemato-
graph, Television & Allied Technicians, [1963] 2 Q.B. 606, (Diplock, L.J.).
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articles (bylaws) often modified this general rule.14 1 These provisions
ensure shareholder awareness of such contracts, and remove any limi-
tations on their voidability if they are not properly authorized.
Neither the approval requirements for employment contracts nor
for substantial property transactions with directors apply to wholly-
owned subsidiaries, whether incorporated in Britain or overseas, or to
foreign holding companies of a British subsidiary. 4 2 Exceptions for
wholly-owned subsidiaries seem justified by the absence of any oppor-
tunity for self-dealing to the detriment of minority shareholders. The
exception for foreign holding companies of British subsidiaries avoids
having an extra-territorial effect when no real British interests are in-
volved. The approval requirements, however, are applicable to con-
tracts and transactions between directors of British holding companies
and any non-wholly-owned subsidiary, whether British or foreign. 43
Sections 49 to 53 regulate company loans to directors. They re-
place section 190 of the 1948 Act which was often avoided in prac-
tice. 44 Section 49 prohibits any company from making a loan to one of
its directors or to a director of its holding company. It also prohibits a
public company, and any private company connected with a public
company, from making a loan, quasi loan, 145 or entering a credit trans-
action as a creditor' 46 to such a director or any person connected with
such a director.147 This section also prohibits any company from guar-
anteeing or providing security on any prohibited transaction, or from
arranging for the assignment to the company or the assumption by the
company of any rights, obligations, or liabilities under such a transac-
tion, 14  or from participating in any arrangements whereby anotherperson enters such a transaction. 49
141 See L. GowER, supra note 4, at 586.
142 1980 Act, ch. 22, §§ 47(6), 48(6).
143 Id. §§ 41(1)-(2), 48(1).
144 CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECToRs, CMD. 3, No. 7037, at 2, 8 (1977).
145 A quasi loan is a transaction under which the "creditor" pays a sum of money for the
"borrower" or reimburses expenditures incurred for the "borrower" where the "borrower" will
then pay back the "creditor." 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 65(2)(a).
146 A credit transaction is a transaction where the "creditor": (1) supplies goods or sells land
under a hire purchase or conditional sale agreement; (2) leases or hires goods or land in return for
periodic payments; or (3) disposes of land or supplies goods or services where payment is to be
deferred. Id. § 65(3).
147 Id. § 49(l)(b). Connected people are spouses; minor children or stepchildren; a company in
which the director or a connected person owns one fifth of the share capital or one fifth of the
voting power, a trustee where the director or a connected person is a beneficiary of the trust; or a
partner of the director or a connected person. Id. § 64(1).
148 Id. § 49(2)(b), (3).
149 Id. § 49(4).
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Section 50, however, sets out various exceptions to the prohibitions
in section 49. Holding companies may make loans, quasi loans, and
guarantee or provide security on loans and quasi loans to their subsidi-
aries regardless of any interests in that subsidiary owned by a director
of the holding company.'5 0 A subsidiary may make loans, quasi loans,
enter credit transactions as a creditor, and guarantee or provide secur-
ity on any loan, quasi loan, or credit transaction to its holding com-
pany. 51 A company is also allowed to do anything to provide funds to
its directors to meet expenditures for company purposes, as long as the
action has been approved by the shareholders or is done on the condi-
tion that if it is not approved by the shareholders, the transaction will
be discharged within six months.' 52 For public companies and compa-
nies connected with public companies, this exception is limited to
amounts not exceeding £10,000.153 The prohibitions on quasi loans and
credit transactions applicable to public companies and companies con-
nected with public companies are also set aside if the quasi loan does
not exceed £1,000 and is to be paid within two months, 154 or if the
credit transaction is either less than £5,000, or if it is made in the ordi-
nary course of business of the company on the usual terms and for any
ordinary amount. 5 Money lending companies may make loans, quasi
loans, and guarantee or provide security on loans and quasi loans to
directors and connected persons if it is done in the ordinary course of
business on the usual terms and for an ordinary amount.156 This
amount is limited in the case of money lending companies which are
not banks to £50,000. Money lending companies may also make a loan
of up to £50,000 to a director at more favorable terms than usual to
facilitate the purchase or improvement of the director's main residence
if such loans are ordinarily made to its employees on the same terms.
The company may void any transaction or arrangement in viola-
tion of the section 49 prohibitions unless restitution is no longer possi-
ble, or the company has already been indemnified for any loss, or such
an avoidance would affect a third party who was unaware of the viola-
tion. 157 Any director or connected person involved, and any director
who knowingly authorized the violation, are accountable to the com-
150 Id. § 50(1).
151 Id. § 50(4).
152 Id. §§ 50(4)(c), (5).
153 Id. § 505(5).
154 Id. § 50(2)(b).
155 Id. § 50(3).
156 Id. §§ 50(6), (7).
157 Id. § 52(1).
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pany for any gains to them and liable to the company for loss or dam-
age to it.'5 ' A director who authorizes or permits, or any person who
procures, the involvement of a public company or a company con-
nected with a public company in a transaction which that person knows
or has reasonable cause to believe was a violation of these prohibitions
is subject to criminal penalties (fines and up to two years imprison-
ment). ' 59 Likewise, a company involved in a transaction prohibited to
it is guilty and subject to fine, unless the company did not know the
relevant circumstances. 6
0
Sections 54 to 61 require disclosure of certain contracts and trans-
actions with directors. Section 54 requires disclosure of any loans,
quasi loans, or credit transactions made by the company or its subsidi-
ary to a director of the company, a director of its holding company, or a
connected person, and disclosure of any guarantee or provision of se-
curity made by the company or its subsidiary on loans, quasi loans, or
credit transactions made by a third party to such a director or con-
nected person. Any other transactions of a company or its subsidiary in
which a director of the company or a director of its holding company
had a material interest must also be disclosed, including contracts for
services. 16 1 A credit transaction, or a guarantee or provision of security
thereon, which does not exceed £5,000 and any material interest which
does not exceed £5,000 or which does not exceed one percent of net
assets and £1,000 are exempt from the disclosure requirement. 162 Sec-
tion 56 also requires a statement of the outstanding amount of any
loan, quasi loan, or credit transaction to any non-director officer of the
company.
Banks are excused from the disclosure requirements of section 54
and the requirements in regard to non-director officers of section 56,
but are required by section 56 to state the outstanding amount of any
loan, quasi loan, credit transaction, or guarantee or provision of secur-
ity on a loan, quasi loan, or credit transaction to a director or connected
person. 163 Where the amounts exceed £1,000, banks must also make
the information required by section 54 available for inspection by the
158 Id. § 52(2).
159 Id. § 53.
160 Id.
161 See supra note 132. Contracts of service are not required to be disclosed under section 54 of
the 1980 Act because they are already required to be registered under section 26 of the 1967 Act,
as modified by the 1980 Act. Id. § 61. See also infra text accompanying note 165.
162 1980 Act, ch. 22, §§ 58(1), (3).
163 Id. §§ 54(5), 56(3), (4).
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shareholders fifteen days before the company's annual meeting. 164
Section 61 amends section 26 of the 1967 Act. The 1967 Act re-
quires that the company keep director contracts of service161 on file and
available for shareholder inspection. The 1980 Act additionally re-
quires a contract of service between a director of the company and a
subsidiary of the company to be kept on file.166 It excepts, however,
contracts of service with the company where the contract requires the
director to work wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom. In
those cases the 1980 Act merely requires the name of the director in-
volved and the duration of the contract to be noted.1 67 This exemption
was provided to preserve the confidentiality of details of foreign con-
tracts of service with directors to avoid possible embarrassment
abroad. 168
Sections 62 to 67 include supplemental provisions. A shadow di-
rector is defined as a person in accordance with whose instructions the
directors are accustomed to act (not including professional advisors
such as lawyers and accountants), and is to be considered the same as
an actual director in regard to this part of the Act.169 Additionally, the
Secretary of State may extend the disclosure provisions of this part of
the Act to unregistered companies, which are incorporated bodies not
registered in accordance with the Companies Acts.1 70 These include
bodies incorporated by Royal Charter or Private Act of Parliament,
which would otherwise not be covered by the Act.
17 1
The British approach to the conflict of interest problem differs sig-
nificantly from that in the United States. Rather than prohibiting cer-
tain types of transactions, the United States system relies on general
fiduciary duty principles. Contracts in which a director has an interest
are generally not void or voidable if approved by a disinterested major-
ity of the board or ratified by the shareholders.1 71 Many states require
164 Id. § 57.
165 See supra notes 132 and 161 and accompanying text.
166 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 61(l).
167 Id. § 61(2).
168 407 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1085 (1980) (Lord Lyell).
169 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 63.
170 Id. § 67.
171 979 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1158 (1980) (R. Eyre, Under-Secretary of State, Dep't of
Trade).
172 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1979). See also Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 292-93, 67
S.W. 92, 95 (1902). The Texas court decided that the disinterested directors had the power to bind
the corporation in a transaction with another director as long as that director made full disclosure
of all facts known to him, took no advantage of his position, and concluded a fair contract.
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disclosure of material facts in the process of ratification or approval.1
73
It is also generally required that the transaction be objectively fair. 74
Under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Rule 14a-3 also requires dis-
closure of director interests in proxy statements. 175 Overall, the United
States' approach is much less structured and requires less disclosure.
The British approach has loopholes that the 1980 Act is meant to
correct. Whether the 1980 Act has blocked all the possible means of
evasion will be seen in the future. Although it is probable that some-
one will find a way to abuse the system, the approach has the advan-
tage of having definite rules which businessmen can understand and
which are easier to enforce. Furthermore, the disclosure requirements
may have a general beneficial effect by giving the shareholder and pub-
lic authorities more information and encouraging the directors to avoid
the appearance of impropriety.
PART V: INSIDER DEALING
Part V introduces prohibitions against insider trading. Previously,
there were no legal sanctions aimed specifically at dealings by insid-
ers. 176 The 1948 Act,177 the 1967 Act,178 and the 1976 Act' 79 require
disclosure of holdings and dealings by directors and substantial share-
holders in a company's securities and prohibit directors from buying
options, but these have been described as "somewhat half-hearted re-
straints."'' 10 The Stock Exchange Listing Agreement and the City Code
on Take-overs and Mergers impose certain restraints on directors, but
these lack the authority of law, and, therefore, impose no truly effective
sanctions. 181
The fiduciary duty of directors under common law imposes some
restrictions on insider dealing. These restrictions, however, are rela-
173 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1980). See
also Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S.W. 92 (1902).
174 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 40, at 605.
175 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. 240.14a (1982). See also Gladwin v. Medfield Corp.,
540 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1976) (full details of a contract in which one of the directors had
an interest were not disclosed in the proxy statement, constituting a material omission).
176 CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 144, at 7, 23.
177 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 195.
178 1967 Act, ch. 81, §§ 25-34.
179 1976 Act, ch. 69, §§ 24-27.
180 See L. GOWER, supra note 4, at 55.
181 CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECToRs, supra note 144, at 7, 23. The sanctions which can be
imposed under these restrictions, suspension of the involved stockbroker's membership on the
Stock Exchange and suspension of the quotation of the company's shares, are generally thought to
be insufficient. See 401 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 136 (1979) (Lord Elwyn-Jones).
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tively slight. In the case of Percival v. Wright'82 the court held that
directors dealing in company shares were not under any fiduciary duty
to disclose any inside information unless there was some element of
unfair dealing, such as direct solicitation of the transactions. In Briess
v. Woolley,' 83 liability was imposed for fraudulent misrepresentation
by a director in a securities transaction, evincing another limit on in-
sider dealing. But these decisions did not foreclose a wide range of
abuse of inside information. Company directors and officers were free
to use inside information in market transactions, leading to widespread
insider dealing on the Stock Exchange' 84 and leaving other traders at a
distinct disadvantage. There was general agreement that criminal sanc-
tions were necessary to discourage the practice.1
8 5
Under section 68, individuals connected with a company1 86 are
prohibited from dealing on the Stock Exchange' 87 in the company's
securities if they possess what they know is unpublished price-sensitive
information 8 which they hold by virtue of their position and which
would reasonably be expected not to be disclosed by them except in the
proper performance of their functions. The trading prohibitions extend
to the securities of any other company if the unpublished price-sensi-
tive information relates to any actual or contemplated transaction be-
tween their company and the other company.'8 9 These same trading
prohibitions apply to government employees who possess unpublished
price-sensitive information about the company whose securities they
wish to trade.190 Finally, an individual contemplating or who has con-
182 [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 426.
183 1954 A.C. 333. The director neglected to tell the purchasers ofthe company that the appar-
ent profits were due to engaging in illegal practices.
184 Gleeson, hy the Ciy has Qualms Over Insider Dealing, The Times (London), I Nov. 1978,
at 23 (quoting David Hopkinson).
185 400 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1251 (1979) (Lord Elwyn-Jones).
186 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 73(1). This section defines an individual connected with a company as a
person who is a director of the company or a related company, or a person who occupies a posi-
tion as an officer or employee of that company, or who has a business or professional relation to
that company which might be reasonably expected to give him access to unpublished price-sensi-
tive information which would be reasonably expected not to be disclosed by him except in the
proper performance of his functions.
187 The Stock Exchange is the recognized exchange under the 1948 Act, II & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38,
§ 455(1). Any dealings not on the Stock Exchange, including off-market dealings and dealings on
a foreign exchange, are considered to be dealing otherwise than on a recognized exchange.
188 Unpublished price-sensitive information is defined as information relating to specific mat-
ters (rather than general matters) relating to or of concern to a company, which is not generally
known to investors, but if known would be likely to affect the price of the company's securities.
1980 Act, ch. 22, § 73(2).
189 Id. § 68(2).
190 Id. § 69.
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templated a take-over offer for a company may not deal in that com-
pany's securities in another capacity if he knows that the fact that the
offer is contemplated or no longer contemplated is unpublished price-
sensitive information.' 91
An individual who has knowingly obtained, directly or indirectly,
from a connected person or a government employee, information
which the individual knows is unpublished price-sensitive information
and knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the connected person
or government employee held this information by virtue of his position
and would reasonably be expected not to disclose it, is also prohibited
from dealing on the Stock Exchange in the securities of that com-
pany.192 An individual is also prohibited from dealing on the Stock
Exchange in a company's securities if he has knowingly obtained from
a person contemplating or who has contemplated a take-over offer
from the company, what he knows to be unpublished price-sensitive
information about that offer. 193 Further, any person prohibited from
trading on the Stock Exchange in a company's securities may not coun-
sel or procure any other person to deal in those securities or communi-
cate the unpublished price-sensitive information to any other person, if
he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that that person will make
use of the information to deal, counsel, or procure another person to
deal in those securities on the Stock Exchange.
194
. Al the references to dealing on the Stock Exchange are also appli-
cable to dealing as an off-market dealer,195 making a market 196 in ad-
vertised securities, 197 and dealing through such an off-market dealer
knowing that he is an off-market dealer making a market in advertised
securities. 198 The prohibitions on counseling or procuring another per-
son to deal and on communicating information also extend to situa-
tions where the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe
that a person will deal on a stock exchange outside Great Britain. 199
191 Id. § 68(4).
192 Id. §§ 68(3), 69(l).
193 Id. § 68(5).
194 Id. §§ 68(6), (7).
195 An off-market dealer may be any licensed or exempted dealer in securities or a member of
the Stock Exchange or of a recognized association of dealers in securities. Id. § 70(3).
196 "Making a market in securities" is defined as an off-market dealer holding himself out to
prospective buyers and sellers of those securities as willing to deal in them otherwise than on the
Stock Exchange. Id. § 73(4).
197 Advertised securities are securities listed on the Stock Exchange, or securities where infor-
mation regarding the prices at which persons are willing to deal in those securities has been pub-
lished within the six previous months. Id. § 70(3).
198 Id. § 70(1).
199 Id. § 70(2).
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The Act does not, however, cover direct dealings on a foreign stock
exchange by a connected person, government employee, or individual
contemplating a take-over, nor any foreign off-market deals. These
prohibitions do apply to securities of a company regardless of where
the company is incorporated. 200
Sections 68 and 69 exempt from these prohibitions any actions of
an individual which lack the intent of making a profit or avoiding a
loss for himself or another person by use of the information. This ex-
emption is meant to provide protection for innocent dealings which
were not motivated by the possession of inside information u.20  Also
exempted are liquidators, receivers, and trustees in bankruptcy who are
acting in good faith, as well as anything done by a jobber202 in good
faith in the normal course of his business with information reasonably
expected for him to have obtained.2 '3 Trustees or personal representa-
tives who would be prohibited from dealing may deal if acting on the
advice of someone who appeared to him to be an appropriate advisor
not prohibited from dealing. Also, a person involved in a transaction
which would cause him to be prohibited from dealing, counseling, pro-
curing, and communicating may do anything to facilitate the comple-
tion or carrying out of the transaction without violating those
prohibitions.204 An exemption is also provided for good faith actions
by issue managers of international bond issues (Eurobonds),05 or their
officers, employees, and agents.2 °0 Many well-established practices of
the Eurobond market might have been affected by the prohibitions,
and it was not considered necessary to extend the insider dealing provi-
sions to them.20 7
200 Id. § 73(5).
201 CoNDucr oF CoMPAY DmEcroPs, supra note 144, at 7, 1 25.
202 A jobber acts as a middleman between brokers who wish to buy and sell a company's
securities on the Stock Exchange.
203 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 68(8).
204 Id. § 68(10). For example, a broker may purchase shares of a company requested by his
client even though the broker possesses inside information relating to that company. 407 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1135 (1980) (Viscount Trenchard).
205 International bond issues are debentures of a company offered by an off-market dealer and
denominated in sterling. Additionally, not less than 50% in nominal value of the debentures must
be offered to persons who are not citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or companies
incorporated or formed under the law of the United Kingdom. 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 71(2). "While
many recognize a Eurobond when they see one, it is especially difficult to define it [sic]." 979
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1168 (1980) (C. Parkinson).
206 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 7 1(1).
207 407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1142 (1980) (Viscount Trenchard). It was thought that the
Eurobond market did not have the same need for insider dealing regulation because of its profes-
sionalism and because it is not greatly affected by information about particular companies.
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Section 72 provides criminal penalties (fines and up to two years
imprisonment) for any violations of the insider dealing provisions. The
imposition of any new civil liability was thought impracticable since
the identity of a victim is usually unknown and untraceable due to the
volume and impersonality of transactions on the Stock Exchange.0 8 It
might be possible for an identifiable victim to bring an action under the
common law limitations on insider dealing, or compensation could be
awarded under the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 197329 which
allows the court to order a convicted person to pay compensation in
favor of an identified person.
The requirements for gaining a conviction are fairly stringent. In
all cases the prosecution must prove knowledge that the information
was unpublished price-sensitive information. This knowledge, how-
ever, may be inferred from a deliberate choice to utilize the informa-
tion to deal.210  To gain a conviction for counseling or procuring
another person to deal, the prosecution must prove that the individual
knew or had reasonable cause to believe that that person would deal, or
for communicating the information, that that person would deal, coun-
sel, or procure another person to deal. It has been suggested21' that
"reasonable cause to believe" imposes an objective test of what a rea-
sonable man would believe under the circumstances.212 To gain a con-
viction for acting on unpublished price-sensitive information
originating from and passed on by a connected person or a government
employee, the prosecution must prove the defendant knew or had rea-
sonable cause to believe that the information was from such a person,
and knew or had reasonable cause to believe that it was obtained by
such a person by virtue of his position and was reasonably expected not
to be disclosed by him. These requirements make it unlikely that a
person receiving information from someone other than the insider
would be convicted, since the requisite knowledge or belief would
208 CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 144, at 7, 24.
209 ch. 62, § 35. This section states, in pertinent part: "(1) . . a court by or before which a
person is convicted of an offense.... may, on application or otherwise, make an order...
requiring him to pay compensation for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from that
offense .... "
210 Ashe, Companies Act 1980-I, 130 NEw L.J. 672, 674 (1980).
211 407 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1128 (1980) (Viscount Trenchard).
212 It might possibly be interpreted to require actual belief, as in Rex v. Banks, [1916] 1 K.B.
621. This case, however, involves a reasonable belief defense to the offense of having intercourse
with a girl under 16, which would seem to justify implying a requirement of actual belief more
than under this Act. The Act's clear distinction between knowledge and reasonable cause to be-
lieve would also seem to indicate actual belief is not requisite to obtaining a conviction.
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probably be missing.2 13
The British approach under the 1980 Act differs greatly from the
approach in the United States under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.214 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is narrow in its
application, allowing the company to recover any profit realized in
trading in the company's securities by a director, officer, or substantial
stockholder within a six month period. This rule is applicable regard-
less of whether the director, officer, or substantial stockholder actually
had any inside information or intended to make a profit.215 Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much broader than 16(b),
prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities. This prohibition has al-
lowed private suit against individuals trading with inside
information.2"6 Economic incentives aid in the enforcement of the pro-
visions, as companies under 16(b) and individuals under 10(b) are di-
rectly rewarded for bringing successful actions. The ambiguous limits
on the 10(b) private right of action and the problems over causation
between the insider dealing and any injury to the plaintiff have been
the subject of much litigation, however.
2 17
The British approach is somewhere between the two relevant
United States provisions. It gives less discretion to the court in defining
illegal insider dealing and molding a remedy than section 10(b), but it
is much less mechanical than section 16(b). It therefore should avoid
the pitfalls of section 10(b), while the detail provided in the 1980 Act
should pick up most abuses. Because of the exception for innocent in-
tent, it will also avoid picking up innocent transactions that might be
included in the scope of section 16(b). Yet, it may not be as effective as
the United States provisions, since its enforcement is in the hands of
the public authorities who do not have the economic incentives pro-
vided by the United States approach, and because of the difficulty in
213 Ashe, supra note 210, at 673.
214 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) el. seq. (1976).
215 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943) (defendants held liable for
trading profits even though it was conceded that they had made no unfair use of inside
information).
216 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (two shareholders
bought out the other two shareholders without informing them of an agreement to sell the corpo-
ration to a third party).
217 Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974) (causation unless relationship shown between the buyer and the seller), with Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976) (refusing to assume causation unless relationship shown
between buyer and seller).
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proving all the necessary elements of the offense under the 1980 Act.218
PART VI: MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL
Part VI makes miscellaneous changes in company law not covered
by the other parts of the Act. Section 74 is meant to specifically repeal
the rule in Park v. Daily News Ltd ,219 which held that a company could
not make provisions for its employees when winding up, since there
was no longer any interests of the company to be served in doing so.
By explicitly allowing for provision for employees and former employ-
ees when closing down the whole or part of any business regardless of
the interests of the shareholders, this section removes any doubt about
the application of section 46 to this type of situation, where there is a
direct conflict between the interests of the employees and the share-
holders.22 0 The section requires that such provisions for employees
must be ratified by a shareholder resolution, unless the company's
memorandum or articles (by laws) allow a director resolution to suffice
or require a special resolution by the shareholders.221
Basic considerations in choosing a secretary222 for a public com-
pany are also established.22 Boards must choose only people who ap-
pear to have the requisite knowledge and experience, and who now
hold or have recently held a position as a public company secretary, or
who are members of specified accounting associations, or who are bar-
risters, advocates, or solicitors, or who appear capable of handling the
position by virtue of holding or having held some other office or being
members of other associations.224 For all their specificity, these re-
quirements still give a fairly open-ended choice to the board, and seem
to amount to little more than a requirement to act in good faith in
choosing a secretary.
The penalties under the Companies Acts are increased in order to
provide a more realistic deterrent to violations and catch up with infla-
tion.225 Monetary penalties are now stated in terms of the statutory
maximum to facilitate future readjustments.226 Section 83 revives parts
218 See 407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1126 (1980) (Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran).
219 See supra note 121.
220 See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 31.
222 The secretary is a company officer, required by the 1948 Act, who keeps the company's
records, countersigns documents, etc. 1948 Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 177.
223 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 76.
224 Id. § 79(1).
225 Id. § 80.
226 Section 28 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, ch. 45, fixes the statutory maximum at £1,000, and
section 61 of that act provides the procedure for changing that amount.
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of the Protection of Depositors Act, 1963,27 which had been repealed
by the Banking Act, 1979.228 The Protection of Depositors Act, 1963,
required certain standards and financial reports from companies hold-
ig and soliciting deposits. The Banking Act, 1979, replaced the former
standards and requires companies to obtain a license in order to take
deposits. The Banking Act, however, did not consider existing ac-
counts with companies who did not obtain the new license. The 1980
Act reinstates the Protection of Depositors Act in regard to those com-
panies without a license who, though no longer able to take deposits,
still hold accounts.229
Possibly one of the most dramatic changes in British company law
is accomplished by section 75. This section is designed to open up the
courts to shareholders on a much broader basis than has previously
been allowed.23 The 1843 case of Foss v. Harbotle23 1 greatly restricted
the right of shareholders to bring derivative suits. Foss v. Harbottle
states that in the case of a wrong done to the company, the company is
the proper plaintiff, and where a wrong could be ratified by a simple
majority of the shareholders, no individual member could bring an ac-
tion.232 Four basic exceptions are recognized to the rule in Foss v. Har-
bottle.3 3 The first exception is where the company's actions or
proposed actions are ultra vires.234 The second exception is where a
special resolution of the company is required but has not been ob-
tained.23 5 The third exception is where a suit is brought to protect a
personal right of a shareholder. 23 6 Suits protecting a personal right in-
clude the two previous exceptions23 7 and where the company is acting
227 1963, ch. 16.
228 1979, ch. 37.
229 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 83.
230 Id. § 75.
231 [1843] 67 Eng. Rep. 189.
232 Id. at 490, 494. See also J. CHARLEsWORTH & T. CAiN, supra note 67, at 377.
233 See Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1067.
234 See Bagshaw v. Eastern Union Ry. Co., [1849] 68 Eng. Rep. 46, aft'd, [1850] 42 Eng. Rep.
151. A misapplication of corporate funds ultra vires to the company was successfully challenged
by a shareholder.
235 See Baillie v. Oriental Tel. & Elec. Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 503. An improperly passed special
resolution could not disallow a shareholder's suit contesting director compensation.
236 See Pender v. Lushington, [1877] 6 Ch. D. 70, 80-81 (Sir G. Jessel, M.R.). A shareholder's
suit to have his vote recorded involves an individual right which he may enforce.
237 See Simpson v. Westminister Palace Hotel Co., [1860] 8 H.L.C. 712, 717 (Lord Campbell,
L.C.). A shareholder has a personal right to contest acts which are ultra vires to the company. See
also Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1066. A union's disregard of a special resolu-
tion requirement was a wrong done to each member individually, allowing a member to maintain
an action.
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contrary to its articles (bylaws).238  The fourth exception is where the
acts or proposed acts constitute a fraud on the minority. As the term is
used, fraud on the minority does not require actual deceit, but rather
refers to an abuse of power similar to the misuse of a fiduciary posi-
tion.239 Fraud on the minority includes expropriations of company240
or shareholder property24I and breaches of a director's duty of good
faith.242 A possible fifth exception is where the interests of justice re-
quire.243 Even with these exceptions, however, the rule in Foss v. Har-
bottle significantly hampered shareholder actions and thereby limited
court involvement in company affairs.244
Instead of bringing a derivative suit, a shareholder may also peti-
tion the court under the 1980 Act for an order winding up the company
under sections 222 and 224 of the 1948 Act if it is 'just and equita-
ble.'245 Winding up orders have generally been confined to companies
dependent on personal relationships and to situations outside the con-
templation of the parties upon becoming shareholders.246 The effect of
a winding up order is to cause the company to go out of business and to
distribute its assets. This is a very drastic remedy, and consequently
there must be some serious problem to justify its application, and it is
uncommon in practice.247
Section 210 of the 1948 Act provided the shareholder an alterna-
238 See L. GOWER, supra note 4, at 654, J. CHARLESWORTH & T. CAIN, supra note 67, at 381.
239 See Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd. v. Greater London Council, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 2. The vote
by the Greater London Council, as the only voting shareholder in a tenants association, to drop a
suit against itself constituted a fraud on the minority, allowing a tenant to sue. The judge dis-
cussed the term "fraud on the minority," and, though he avoided any attempt to clarify its limits,
stated that it did not require any actual fraud.
240 See Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Works, [1874] 9 Ch. App. 350. The majority shareholder
caused the company to abandon a suit, and it alone received benefits from the adverse party. The
minority shareholder was allowed to bring suit to recover these benefits.
241 See Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co., [1919] 1 Ch. 290. The majority shareholders
attempted to change the articles to allow them to require the minority shareholder to sell his
shares. The minority shareholder was allowed to contest the proposed alteration.
242 See Mason v. Harris, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 97. Fraud committed by a director who commanded
a majority of votes and was aided and abetted by the other directors allowed a shareholder to
bring suit.
243 Foss v. Harbottle, [18431 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (Wigram, V.C.). This exception has not
been articulated and is generally thought to be impractical. See Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Nemman Industries (No. 2), [1982] 2 W.L.R. 31.
244 The rule and its exceptions have also created a good deal of confusion, taking the matter
"into the realms of near incomprehensibility." 407 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1023 (1980) (Lord
Lloyd of Kilgerran).
245 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 75(1).
246 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd., 1973 A. C. 360. One of three shareholders was
removed from office and excluded from the business.
247 See J. CHARLESWORTH & T. CAIN, supra note 67, at 385.
The Companies Act, 1980
4:551(1982)
tive to petitioning for a winding up order. Under this section the court
could make any order it saw fit, after a member proved that the affairs
of the company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some
part of the members, and that it was just and equitable to wind up the
company, but that such a winding up would unfairly prejudice the op-
pressed members. The procedure under this section, however, was
rarely used successfully24 because of the heavy requirement of show-
ing that it was just and equitable to impose the drastic remedy of a
winding up order, and because of restrictive interpretation by the
courts of the term "oppressive" as requiring conduct which was "bur-
densome, harsh and wrongful."249
Section 75 of the present Act replaces section 210, and allows any
shareholder to petition the court on the ground that the company's af-
fairs are being, have been, or are proposed to be conducted in a manner
unfairly prejudicial to a part of the shareholders.250 If the petition is
well founded, the court can order any remedy it feels appropriate, in-
cluding, but not limited to, regulating the company's affairs, authoriz-
ing the institution of a derivative suit, requiring the purchase of shares
of any shareholder by other shareholders or the company, and making
or prohibiting any alterations in the company's articles or memoran-
dum. 5 These provisions remove most of the limitations on share-
holder access to the court and give the court wide discretion in
fashioning remedies. 252 They allow the rule in Foss v. Harbottle to be
circumvented with the approval of the court. They lower the require-
ment of showing oppressive conduct to that of merely showing unfair
prejudice. They introduce a duty not to act unfairly which is enforcea-
ble by a shareholder.
One apparent limitation on the availability of remedies under this
section is that the prejudice must affect apart of the shareholders. This
language may eliminate the possibility of using this section to redress
248 One commentator states that there are only two reported cases where the process has been
successfully used. L. GowEPR, supra note 4, at 662.
249 See Meyer v. Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soe'y, 1959 A. C. 324, 342 (Viscount Simonds).
The Majority was attempting to destroy the company while appropriating the goodwill of the
company's business.
250 1980 Act, ch. 22, § 75(1).
251 d. §§ 75(3)-(5).
252 The court of appeals has considered section 75 twice since its passage. In In re Bovey Hotel
Ventures, Ltd., Transcript Assoc. (June 10, 1982), one of two equal shareholders complained that
the other, her ex-husband, was uncooperative and had taken money from the company. The court
balanced interests and allowed her to buy out the ex-husband. The court in In re Cyplon Devel-
opments Ltd., Transcript Assoc. (Mar. 3, 1982), affirmed the trial judge's order allowing a share-
holder derivative action over disputed property. The court stated that it would not interfere with
the trial court's discretion unless it was unreasonable.
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wrongs done to the whole company.25 3 Such wrongs, which are also
within the Foss v. Harbottle rule, would then be left to the company
itself. As long as the interests of a group of shareholders is not
prejudiced in relation to the rest, it would seem within the power of the
directors and a majority of shareholders to decide whether or not it is
in the interest of the company as a whole to bring suit.
Another possible limitation on court involvement is the British
version of the business judgment rule in the United States.254 The Brit-
ish courts have expressed an unwillingness to interfere in a company's
affairs unless the directors acted in bad faith.255 This unwillingness
may result in the court refusing to redress actions prejudicial to a part
of the shareholders if such action was made in what the directors hon-
estly considered to be in the interests of the company as a whole.
It also remains to be seen to what extent shareholders will take
advantage of section 75. Public company shareholders may feel litiga-
tion is not worth their time and expense, even though they might easily
bring an action under section 75. Private company shareholders are
much more likely to take advantage of the section, since they lack a
ready market for their shares and often have more of a personal stake
in the company.2 5 6
Section 75 catapults the British into many areas long handled by
derivative suits in the United States. However, the British enter the
field without the accumulated rules and requirements built up by statu-
tory and common law in the United States. It will be interesting to see
whether such rules develop as the courts begin to deal with the poten-
tial mass of litigation, or whether the courts retain the great amount of
discretion implied by the Act. Because of the latitude given in selecting
remedies, the court has license to become involved in corporate affairs
to an extent unknown in the United States. Here again, whether the
courts take up this opportunity and use it fully is yet to be seen.
CONCLUSION
The Companies Act 1980 makes important changes in British
253 See L. GOWER, supra note 4, at 670.
254 See Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, a'd, 54 A.D.2d
654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976). Errors of judgment are not sufficient grounds for the court to
interfere in the management of a corporation.
255 See Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., [1889] 41 Ch. D. 1, 18. The court is unwilling to inter-
fere if the board fairly and reasonably acted in ascertaining whether the dividend was proper. See
also Dovey v. Cory, 1901 A.C. 477 (directors are not liable for honest and reasonable mistakes).
256 The two cases involving section 75 which have reached the court of appeals have both
involved private companies. See supra note 252.
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company law, and additional modifications are likely as future EEC
directives are issued. Parts I, II, and III of the Act are largely technical
in nature, clarifying and rationalizing the laws concerning a company's
capital. The major changes involve the definitions of private and pub-
lic companies, which increase the requirements for public company sta-
tus, and the creation of renewed distinctions between the regulatory
standards applicable to each.
Part IV, by regulating employment contracts, substantial property
transactions, and loans involving directors, also introduces some large
changes. It closes a number of loopholes in past legislation and the
common law, but it does not change the overall approach. The new
duty imposed on directors to regard employee interests is not a radical
shift, but rather, reflects current practices.
Part V, which makes insider dealing a criminal offense, could have
a significant impact on trading in British securities. It remains to be
seen how it will work in practice and whether its detailed approach will
catch the undesirable activities within its bounds, and whether the pub-
lic authorities can effectively enforce it.
Finally, the new provisions under section 75 for court involvement
in company affairs could have a significant impact on the amount of
litigation over company-related matters. What effect it will have on
company policies and how far the courts will go, however, remains
unclear.
M Freeman Durham
